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1. Introduction  
 
In this thesis I will be arguing that species are to be best understood in terms of the cohesion 
concept of species, as expounded by Wiley, Brooks and Collier.1 Species are held together by 
forces, or mechanisms, that maintain their distinctness from other species. Species under this 
view are individuals (as opposed to classes or colle tions), and are dynamical systems which are 
best delineated according to the principles which individuate all dynamical systems (i.e. 
cohesion).  The reason why such a theory is necessary i  because of the lack of a single, 
sufficient account of species in modern biology. Myinitial claim is that biology is plagued today 
by numerous, similar, yet often conflicting concepts of species, resulting in problems for 
biologists trying to work towards a singular phylogenetic tree for the living world, which the 
theory of evolution by natural selection predicts. Some examples of this are the trap door spider 
of Southern California, or the Aptostichus atomarius species complex. In a paper by Bond & 
Stockman (2008) entitled An Integrative Method for Delimiting Cohesion Species: Finding the 
Population-Species Interface in a Group of Californian Trapdoor Spiders with Extreme Genetic 
Divergence and Geographic Structuring, this specific species complex is shown to have a highly 
variable number of actual species, depending on which species complex is employed, as they 
state: 
 
Highly structured, genetically divergent, yet morphologically homogenous species 
(e.g., nonvagile cryptic species), although often ignored or overlooked, provide one 
                                                           
1
 Templeton (1992) also has a cohesion concept of species, but it is much more nominal than the 
view I defend and lacks the unifying character of the dynamical approach used in this thesis 
because it posits only a collection of mechanisms without a general account of how they are 
related or interact with each other. 
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of the greatest challenges to delimiting species (e.g., Bond et al. 2001; Hedin and 
Wood 2002; Sinclair et al. 2004; Boyer et al. 2007). Populations, or very small 
groups of populations, constitute divergent genetic lineages but present somewhat 
of a contradiction because they lack the “requisite” characteristics often used when 
delimiting species. Morphological approaches to species delimitation in many of 
these groups grossly oversimplify and underestimate div rsity (Bond et al. 2001; 
Bickford et al. 2006); in short, these traditional applications fail if our interests 
extend beyond what can simply be diagnosed with a visual and/or 
anthropomorphic-based assessment. When genetically divergent, morphologically 
equivalent lineages exhibit microallopatric population structuring, lineage-based 
approaches to delineating species are further confounded; virtually all population 
groups are independent lineages and, thus, qualify as species (Agapow et al. 2004; 
Hickerson et al. 2006), likely yielding specious reults. 
 
These sorts of problems are common in biology, and result in the sort of confusion displayed 
above. The debate over which species concept is the most suitable is one which rages on. 
Various theorists have weighed in on the debate, all the way from Aristotle to more modern 
thinkers like Ernst Mayr and Alan Templeton. Aristotle posited an essentialist and typological 
species concept, in which species were defined according to specific properties which gave them 
their being. More modern thinkers dismiss this typological thinking, acknowledging that species 
are better treated as individuals instead of classes, and posit certain specific forces by which we 
are to define them; for instance, Ernst Mayr’s Biological species concept, which treats species as 
actual or potentially interbreeding populations of organisms. Other species concept favour 
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ecological factors, mate recognition, competition, a d others as being the primary defining 
aspects of species. 
 
It is my contention in this thesis that these species concepts all fail for more or less the same 
reason, and that a better way of defining species exists. My argument is that most modern species 
concepts are reductionist (or operationalist) in nature, and that they fail because they ignore the 
various developments made in the actual science of ev lutionary biology. This phenomenon, I 
claim, is largely unknown to most theorists, and occurs due to residual and tacit assumptions 
creeping in from outdated species concepts, and leftov r empiricist tendencies. I base my critique 
on a doctrine of naturalized metaphysics which assert  that most modern metaphysics has been 
led astray by a tendency to ignore actual science, as I state in a 2011 paper: 
 
It is Ladyman et al’s claim that modern metaphysics ha  become woefully isolated 
from actual science. Metaphysicians are left arguin over issues long resolved by 
actual science. For instance, Ladyman et al draw attention to the debate amongst 
over the nature of matter, specifically the nature of matter as either ‘gunk’ (in the 
sense of an infinitely divisible substance) or atoms (atoms being partless particles). 
This debate, according to Ladyman et al, ‘is essentially being conducted in the 
same terms as it was by the pre-Socratic philosophers among whom the atomists 
were represented by Democritus and the gunkists by Anaxagoras...It is preposterous 
that in spite of the developments in the scientific understanding of matter that have 
occurred since then, contemporary metaphysicians blithely continue to suppose that 
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the dichotomy between atoms and gunk remains relevant, and that it can be 
addressed a priori.’ (2007 20). (Grant 2011). 
 
 
While many species concepts today posit some mechanism(s) relevant to evolutionary theory, 
the tendency is to restrict the definition to simply one or a few, ignoring a host of others, and in 
so doing limiting the organisms and populations which may be considered species. I argue that 
this is because of residual, tacit assumptions left over from empiricism and other habits of 
science which try to find hard and fast rules to define concepts.  
 
My contention is that the metaphysics concerning species needs to be treated in a naturalistic 
fashion, namely by acknowledging and using our best current, actual, science on the topic. 
Modern evolutionary biology posits a number of mechanisms responsible for evolution and 
change in species, from natural selection and genetic drift, to ecological and developmental 
factors. All of these (and perhaps others yet unknown) need to be taken into account when 
dealing with the individuation of species.  
 
I claim that essentialism about species is not an entirely inaccurate way of approaching the 
problem, and that our best concept should be an essentialist one, albeit a very specific kind of 
essentialist. I argue for the use of Locke’s real essence as a good way of understanding species. 
According to Locke, a real essence of a thing is the underlying causal structure which gives a 
thing its being. My argument is that a good species oncept needs to be true to the causal 
elements which give species their being, and for me these things are evolutionary mechanisms 
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taken as a whole. Other modern species concepts tend to take only one or a few mechanisms and 
treat them as wholly defining of species. This has the unintended consequence of reducing 
species individuation to these mechanisms in an operationalist fashion. At the heart of this is the 
issue of pattern and process in science and trying to find a bridge between the two. Theory is a 
necessary part of bridging this gap if we want to av id certain pitfalls such as extreme micro 
reduction, as I will show.  
 
I begin this thesis by describing a history of species concepts in order to illustrate the problem 
and shed light on how it is that we got to where we are now. From there I go on to expound the 
doctrine of naturalized metaphysics and show how it is relevant to the species problem, and 
argue for why it is the best way of approaching it. I will then go into some detail about the 
specifics of the metaphysics, such as the problem of operationalism, and how Locke’s real 
essences are an appropriate way of approaching the problem. I argue that species are best 
understood as dynamical systems, which are systems governed by forces and flows, and 
therefore the best way to individuate species is the same way in which all dynamical systems are 
individuated, namely through cohesion.  
 
I also go on to show how, using Kuhnian theories of the structure of scientific theories and the 
nature of paradigms, it is possible that tacit assumptions in science can be passed on from one 
paradigm to the next. The term ‘species’ itself carries with it many of the assumptions present in 
earlier paradigms such as Aristotle’s, and so I claim that it is because of this that a large amount 




2. History  
 
Most of the current literature on the species problem divides its history into roughly three major 
epochs. The first epoch is the epoch of Aristotle and essentialism. The second is that of Darwin, 
and the impact the theory of evolution by natural selection had on our understanding of species. 
The third epoch is the one we are in now, which is a kind of pluralist epoch that I will say began 
around the middle of the 20th century with Michael Ghiselin’s (1974) and David Hull’s (1978) 
independent ‘discoveries’ that species aren’t, in fact, classes, but rather individuals, in an 
ontological sense; that is, species are spatially and temporally located particulars with a history. 
Whilst there is a large degree of consensus surrounding the notion of species as individuals, there 
is a quite spectacular multitude of concepts about the nature of those individuals. For instance, 
are they individuals composed of organisms that can interbreed (Mayr & Provine 1981)? Or are 
they individuals composed of organisms that recognize each other and can thus mate (Paterson 
1980)? Or, are they something entirely different? This is the central question I will be attempting 
to answer in this thesis. In order to do this, however, it will be useful to examine how it was that 
we got to where we are now in terms of our understanding of the term ‘species’. What we are 
dealing with, loosely, is a series of Kuhnian scientific revolutions within the realm of biology 
through which the term ‘species’ has survived, but which has changed its meaning somewhat. I 
feel it is largely the unjustified retention of previous understandings of ‘species’ that has 
contributed to much of the confusion and conflict regarding species concepts that we see today. 
This question I will deal with as this thesis unfolds. For now I would like to take a look at the 






Most historians of the species problem begin their account with Aristotle. He is believed to be 
the quintessential essentialist, and it is his concept of species as organisms bound to classes 
based on certain essential properties that is taken to be the first. Species, according to Aristotle, 
were ‘eternal, immutable and discrete’ (Hull 1988; 2), much like the basic components that 
made up the natural world. All species had a set of necessary and sufficient morphological 
properties which facilitated the classification of individual organisms into them (Hull 1988). This 
view has, in recent years, come under scrutiny. Some scholars are taking a revisionary approach 
to Aristotle’s work and claiming that, in fact, Aristotle was not committed to essentialism about 
species as we understand it today (Richards 2010). 
 
 
I am no scholar of Aristotle, and thus do not take up the challenge of making truth claims about 
whether or not he was, in fact, an essentialist. My aim in this chapter is somewhat more modest, 
that is, to give as complete an account as possible of the various strands of thought that led 
thinkers in various ages to conjure up this or the other species concept. Thus, this chapter will be 
somewhat more like a dramatis personae of the various conceptual characters in the history of 
the problem. A more ambitious task, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, will be to 
look at and discuss the various contexts in which the term ‘species’ exists/existed and to see how 
the retention of residual meanings has resulted in co fusion. This will give us a better 
understanding not only of how our current species concepts are mistaken, and in which ways 





As stated above, the essentialism of Aristotle has, in recent time, come under the scrutiny of 
historians of biology. It is their claim that Aristotle didn’t hold the essentialist view of species 
that we suppose he did, a claim that is termed the ‘canonical view’ of the history of essentialism 
by Wilson et al (2009), according to which species concepts were essentialist post-Aristotle and 
non-essentialist post-Darwin. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is supposed to 
have shifted our understanding of species to such an extent that any notion of them as immutable 
could no longer stand (Wilson 2009). Again, whether or not this is true falls not within the scope 
of this chapter. My aim is to give an account of the various theoretical frameworks within which 
the term ‘species’ has functioned throughout history, starting with essentialism. I mentioned 
briefly above what essentialism about species entail d. Here I will quote Ernst Mayr for a more 
detailed description: 
 
... [t]here are a limited number of fixed, unchangeabl  "ideas" underlying the 
observed variability [in nature], with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is 
fixed and real, while the observed variability has no more reality than the shadows 
of an object on a cave wall . . For the typologist the type (eidos) is real and the 
variation an illusion. (Mayr 1959). 
 
And here, Ereshefsky: 
 
Kind essentialism has a number of tenets. One tenet is that all and only the 
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members of a kind have a common essence. A second tenet is that the essence of a 
kind is responsible for the traits typically associated with the members of that kind. 
For example, gold's atomic structure is responsible for gold's disposition to melt at 
certain temperatures. Third, knowing a kind's essence helps us explain and predict 
those properties typically associated with a kind. (Ereshefsky 2007a in Wilson et al 
2009) 
 
So, essentialism, in general, posits the notion that individuals of all kinds (living and non-living) 
have a specific property, or set of properties, which defines them in some way. This property, or 
set of properties, constitutes an individual’s ‘being’. These properties, or essences, define kinds, 
which are classes into which individuals are placed based on their possession of this or the other 
property. Sober (1980) suggests a number of conditis that essentialism requires of its defining 
properties: They must be explanatory in some way, i.e. the essential property must explain why a 
particular organism is the way it is. Sober claims that, otherwise, the conditions for essentialism 
can be met trivially (1980). For instance, the condition that all and only the members of a species 
must contain a certain property can be met by simply listing a set of spatiotemporal locations of 
the organisms involved. This is guaranteed by the fact that there is, more than likely, a finite 
number of members of a species (1980). Of course, what essentialists are really looking for is a 
diagnostic property; a property that determines whether any possible organism is a member of a 
certain species (1980). It cannot be the case that there exists a member, say, of Homo Sapiens 
that does not have the defining characteristic which makes it so. Thus it is a necessary truth that 
members of a species have this defining characteristic. This, Sober claims, is equally satisfiable 
by giving the logical truism that all members of Hom  Sapiens are members of Homo Sapiens. 
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Of course the truth of logical claims does not vindicate the truth of essentialism (1980). It is thus 
why Sober claims that essentialists require an explanatory aspect to defining characteristics. 
Sober also stresses that a species needs to be defin d in terms of the organisms which compose 
it. This he calls a ‘constituent definition’ where wholes are defined in terms of their parts. More 
generally, it states that entities at some level of organisation must be defined in terms of some 
lower level of organisation (1980) 
. 
We thus have a suitable account of what essentialism is supposed to be: As well as being a 
general doctrine applying to both living and non-living entities according to which their ‘being’ 
is determined by the possession of a specific property or set of properties, essentialism also 
requires that defining properties be explanatory. It is also necessary that any entity with a 
defining characteristic be part of the group which is defined by that characteristic.     
 
This brand of essentialism in biology is said to have reigned from antiquity to roughly the period 
that Darwin first posited that species change, or ev lve, via a process of natural selection (Sober 
1980; Hull 1988; Richards 2010.). It was this discovery of change which supposedly challenged 
the doctrine and forced its usurpation from primary usage. Sober (1980) challenges this objection 
to essentialism by drawing our attention to a number of facts about it. Firstly, essentialists are not 
necessarily committed to species stasis. It was a quite commonly held belief that organisms 
could change their species, in much the same way that elements in the periodic table transmute 
from one into the other. This was an attribute of the organisms composing a kind, not of the kind 
itself. Kinds are fixed, whereas organisms have the ability to change their kinds, as Hull (1988 
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82) notes: ‘To be sure, an organism might change its species, just as a sample of lead might be 
transmuted into a sample of gold, but the species th mselves remain unchanged in the process’.  
Another common objection to the essentialist concept of species concerns their perceived 
continuity. It is claimed that if species are to be th  kinds they must be discrete. Even Aristotle, 
however, did not fully maintain this notion, as Sober (1980) quotes: 
 
... nature proceeds little by little from inanimate things to living creatures, in such a 
way that we are unable, in the continuous sequence to d termine the boundary line 
between them or to say which side an intermediate kind falls. Next, after inanimate 
things come the plants: and among the plants there are differences between one 
kind and another in the extent to which they seem to share in life, and the whole 
genus of plants appears to be alive when compared with other objects, but seems 
lifeless when compared with animals. The transition fr m them to the animals is a 
continuous one, as remarked before. For with some kinds of things found in the sea 
one would be at a loss to tell whether they are anim ls or plants. (From History of 
Animals in Sober 1980). 
 
Hull (1988) notes the same thing: 
 
[Aristotle] did not think the boundaries in conceptual space between species are 




So, essentialism does not require that organisms reain static, or that they should be strictly 
delineable. Sober (1980) points out that even in cases where essentialism is vindicated, such as 
chemistry, strict delimitation is merely an ideal; vagueness appears everywhere. So, then, in what 
ways does essentialism fail to be a suitable ontology f r species? Sober attributes this to a failure 
to give an adequate account of variability within species. It was long supposed that any 
variability was a consequence of some sort of deviation from a natural norm, brought about by 
certain irregularities (Sober 1980). Morphological differences between organisms in a species 
could be discounted so long as it was the case that there existed some underlying structure, or 
essence (Sober 1980). The epistemic difficulty of unearthing this essence is no strong reason to 
discount its reality; Aristotle, for instance, postulated a Natural State Model which stated that all 
individuals tend towards a Natural State, which is disrupted by outside forces (Sober 1980). Thus 
for Aristotle, most of nature was characterized by ‘monsters’ who didn’t match their Natural 
state (for Aristotle this meant offspring being identical in every way to their paternal parent. 
Females, he thought, were deviation from the Natural St te, albeit necessary deviations) (Sober 
1980). 
 
As time wore on, it became apparent that variations within species were less a deviation from the 
norm than the norm itself. Sober (1980) affords us a useful history of this process with reference 
to the development of error theory. As this field developed, and as our understanding of how 
variation occurred, it became increasingly difficult to sustain the notion that variations amongst 
organisms were the result of deviation from a norm. I will not go into detail on this development, 
but instead simply give a brief account of some of the main points. 
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Early error theory was a theory about errors, and was first developed in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries (Sober 1980). What it sought to do was find a way of interpreting ‘discordant 
observations’ (Sober 1980). The underlying assumption was that in nature there is one true value 
and, in the same way that Aristotle understood it, interfering forces result in divergent results: 
‘The problem for the theory of errors was to penetrat  the veil of variability and to discover 
behind it the single value which was the constant cuse of the multiplicity of different readings.’ 
(Sober 1980). Notice that the theory in this formulation is an epistemological account, not an 
ontological one; it was a theory about why our bservations about nature differ, not about why 
nature itself differs (Sober 1980). The theory was given an ontological slant in the 1830’s by the 
Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet (Sober 1980). He drew on a distinction made by Laplace 
regarding physical forces, between ‘constant causes’ and ‘disturbing causes’ (Sober 1980). 
Quetelet applied this distinction to man and develop d the notion of the average man. Average 
man was, to him, the proper subject of the social sciences (Sober 1980). What this man 
amounted to was the peak of a bell curve. This concept of man is still one in which there is a 
primary, or constant, being, which is acted upon by accidental or disturbing forces, which results 
in their being variations and idiosyncrasies. As Sober expresses it, ‘For Quetelet, variability 
within a population is caused by deviation from type’ (Sober 1980). Such variability is 
something which, for Quetelet, needs to be explained away. It is not something pertinent to the 
entity itself, but rather a barrier to an understanding of the entity. The final move away from the 
notion of variability as deviation from type was instigated by Frances Galton, a cousin of 
Darwin’s, who developed a new way of accounting for va iability: heredity (Sober 1980). 
Although his ideas about heredity are, in retrospect, rather primitive, they are nonetheless pivotal 
in the move away from a typological view of species. For Galton ‘variability is not to be 
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explained away as the result of interference with a single prototype. Rather, variability within 
one generation is explained by appeal to variability in the previous generation and to facts about 
the transmission of variability’ (Sober 1980). Instead of seeing variability as some unfortunate 
by-product of interfering forces, which function solely to cloud a clear view of an essence or 
type, it became something which is an important part of nature itself; something real, and 
causally efficacious (Sober 1980). 
 
This move away from typological thinking resulted in the move towards ‘population thinking’, 
as Sober terms it. This mode is characterized by treating the population ‘as a unit of organization. 
The population is an entity, subject to its own forces, and obeying its own laws’ (Sober 1980; 
370). This move negated the need for constituent definition, something which essentialism relies 
on. As Sober writes, 
 
 
Essentialism requires that species concepts be legitimized by constituent definition, 
but evolutionary theory, in its articulation of population models, makes such 
demands unnecessary. Explanations can proceed without this reductionistic 
requirement being met (Sober 1980; 372). 
 
 
For essentialism, a species or population must be defined in terms of organization at a lower 
level, i.e. the organism. For population thinking, species and populations can be defined in terms 
of their own distinct organisation. This is one way in which evolutionary theory began to 
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undermine essentialist thinking (Sober 1980). The typologist, or essentialist, sees the individual 
as real (with ‘real’ being equated with ‘causally efficacious’), whereas the populationist ignores 
individuals and views as real the organisation of the population as a whole. Each is attempting to 
explain diversity and invariance within populations. Typologists explain away diversity by 
seeking invariant properties amongst individuals. Populationists find invariance in a specific rate 
of divergence (amongst other things) which is a property of populations (Sober 1980).   
 
Perhaps the most significant ontological development r garding species came with their recent 
designation as individuals. Although populationist no ions of species had been around for some 
time, the move towards treating species as individuals was only made explicit, by both Ghiselin 
(1974) and Hull (1978) independently, in the middle to late 20th century. Treating species as 
individuals makes sense from both a biological, as well as a logical perspective (Ghiselin 1974; 
536). The basic point that Ghiselin wants to make is that ‘multiplicity does not suffice to render 
an object a mere class’ (1974; 536). So, for instance, a human being, or a nation state, is made up 
of various parts, but still maintain their status as a single, cohesive entity. David Hull’s argument 
for treating species as individuals centres more around investigating the current ways in which 
biologists talk about species, and concluding that reating them as individuals makes the most 
sense. The basic tenets of each view are that species are historical entities, who, despite their 
multiplicity, in both spatiotemporality and morphology, remain single, individual units of 
organisation. Thus understood, individuals are spatiotemporally restricted entities, which are 





Treating species as individuals places constraints o  the types of species concepts which can be 
accepted. So, any concept which makes it possible, for instance, for the same species to arise in 
separate spatiotemporal localities, must be dismissed.   
 
The move away from typological, or essentialist, thinking, and the adoption of populationist or 
individualist notions of species, has left us not with any single, cohesive species concept. Instead 
we see, more than ever, a smorgasbord of competing and contradictory ones. So we have Mayr’s 
Biological Species concept (Mayr 1992), probably the most widely known and utilized species 
concept, which privileges gene flow and interbreeding over other properties of populations. Here 
species are defined as ‘groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations which 
are reproductively isolated from other such groups’ (Mayr 1963; Mayr 1992). We also have 
Ghiselin’s Reproductive Competition concept (1974) - a twist on the Biological concept which 
treats competition as the main factor; as well as the Recognition species concepts (Paterson & 
McEvey 1993), and Van Valen’s Ecological species concept (1976), to name but a few. The 
question has now largely moved away from species as either classes or individuals and towards 
the question ‘individual whats’ (Ghiselin, 1974 537). This vast array of species concepts has 
convinced some (Mishler & Brandon 1987; Ereshefsky 1998) of pluralism, and in some cases the 
non-reality of species (Ereshefsky 1998). I will deal here with some common pluralistic accounts 
of species, and certain cases where this pluralism has led to species anti-realism. 
 
Pluralistic accounts of species, generally, take the view that there is more than one appropriate 
definition of species (Ereshefsky 1998; Mishler & Brandon 1987). Contrary to this view is 
monism, which posits the existence of a single appro riate species concept; for instance, either 
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Mayr’s Biological concept, or Van Valen’s Ecological concept. According to Ereshf ky (1998), 
there exist at least five different brands of pluralism. These concepts have arisen, he claims, not 
solely because biologists have offered up so many different ones, but instead because of the 
suggestion that more than one of them could be true (Er shefsky 1998). He uses the example of 
the Phylogenetic species concept and the Biological species concept. Each of these concepts 
divides the natural world up differently. For instance, there are many populations which qualify 
as Phylogenetic species (namely, they contain the descendants of an ancestral species) but which 
do not qualify as Biological, or interbreeding species (an example of such a case is asexual 
species, which cannot, obviously, qualify as Biological species, but which can operate as 
Phylogenetic species). Thus, as Ereshefsky points out, evolution segments the natural world into 
a number of different kinds of species, depending on the evolutionary force you choose to 
acknowledge (Ereshefsky 1998; Mishler & Brandon 1987). Pluralists disagree, however, about a 
number of the details of this claim. For instance, Mishler and Brandon (1987) believe that these 
different forces act on different branches of the tre  of life. Thus there is no overlap of organisms 
belonging to two different species (Ereshefsky 1998; 106). On this view there is but one correct 
classification of the natural world. Others, such as Ereshefsky (1998) himself, believe that 
organisms can belong to numerous species at the samtime, for instance, to a Phylogenetic 
species, or a Biological one. Other pluralists, such as Kitcher (1984) and Dupre (1993), espouse 
the more radical view that species can be made up of ‘qualitatively defined sets’ (Ereshefsky 
1998; 107). This view, according to Ereshefsky, is too radical, and has the dire consequence of 
placing species outside of the domain of evolutionary biology (1998; 107); once the genealogical 
connections within species are severed ‘one casts away the primary mode of explanation in 
evolutionary biology’ (Ereshefsky 1998; 107). 
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Associated with pluralism is a debate concerning the reality of species. Not all species pluralists 
are necessarily anti-realists. Kitcher (1984) and Dupre (1993), for instance, take a realist stance, 
arguing for the equally real classifications of theworld afforded by the various species concepts. 
Even the Cohesion concept itself, which I argue for below, is a specific kind of realist pluralism. 
Others such as Stanford (1995) insist that species pluralism should cause us to be anti-realists. 
This is for largely epistemological reasons: we cannot have knowledge about which species 
concept is the correct one; therefore we must remain agnostic, choosing concepts largely on 
instrumental grounds (Ereshefsky 1998; 104; Stanford 1995). Ereshefsky posits another form of 
anti-realism, which is not concerned with the reality of individual species, understood in 
whichever manner, but rather with the existence of the species category (1998). He argues for 
this by claiming that there is nothing in common between different species classified according 
to different concepts. This, he claims, suggests that t ere are different types of species, or base 
taxa, negating the notion of a unified species category (Ereshefsky 1998). 
 
Of course, there have been numerous objections to species pluralism, most obviously coming 
from those who posit specific species concepts (Ereshefsky 1998; Mishler & Brandon 1987; 
Paterson 1980; Ghiselin 1974; Wiley 1981; Mayr 1992). One primary difficulty with pluralism is 
the problem of selecting appropriate concepts for appropriate reasons. Most monists feel that 
pluralism leads to an arbitrary designation of species oncepts (Paterson 1980; Ghiselin 1974; 
Mayr 1992). One pluralist Stanford (1995) has argued that the acceptance of concepts depends 
on their explanatory tractability: ‘Species concepts that allow the construction of explanatorily 
useful classifications should be accepted, provided they are not ‘redundant, boring or 
wrongheaded’ (Stanford 1995; 80). Of course, the acceptance of monism makes demands which 
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cannot be accepted by pluralists: for instance, the exclusion of asexually reproducing organisms 
as species in the Biological species concept (Mayr 1992). 
 
There is yet a third way of dealing with the species problem, which tries to incorporate and unite 
all, or most, of the seemingly disparate species concepts. This is termed the Cohesion concept of 
species. There is, however, more than one Cohesion concept. The term was first coined by 
Brooks and Wiley (1986), and is implicit in Wiley (1981) with its discussion of vertical and 
horizontal cohesion within species, but was later adopted by Alan Templeton (1989) and his 
followers. Templeton’s version is today widely recognized as the Cohesion concept. Cohesion 
thinkers are simultaneously monistic and pluralistic. They are monists in the sense that there is a 
single, broadly defined property which defines species, namely cohesion. They are pluralists in 
that this property is determined of a number of other properties, notably those that make up the 
various other species concepts. Templeton defines the concept as follows: ‘The cohesion concept 
species is the most inclusive population of individuals having the potential for phenotypic 
cohesion through intrinsic cohesion mechanisms’ (1989). The mechanisms here include those 
forces which, singularly, make up the species concepts previously mentioned. They function 
together in the Cohesion concept to maintain a species’ ohesion (Templeton, 1989). So, on this 
account, there is a balancing of the various evolutionary forces, such as gene flow, natural 
selection, genetic drift, as well as ecological and e vironmental factors, whose net effect is a 
cohesive, organized species. To understand the Cohesion concept better, we should mention 






3.  Cohesion 
 
Cohesion is used as the individuating factor, or identity relation, in dynamical systems, i.e. those 
systems governed by forces and flows (Collier 1986, Collier 2010; Wiley 1981). Collier offers us 
this useful definition:  
 
Cohesion refers to the cause of the dynamical stabilities that are necessary for the 
continued existence of a system or system component as a distinct entity… These 
stabilities arise from the constraints which dynamical interactions within a system 
impose on the dynamics of its components. Since stability in even relatively simple 
case resists penetration by traditional methods (see any text on non-linear systems 
for examples), we should not assume that an account f cohesion requires 
mechanism, decomposability, or reductionistic diagnosability. The basic form of 
cohesion is a dynamical property of a system that is insensitive to local variations 
in the system components (e.g. thermal fluctuations, vibrations or collisions), 
including those (non-linear) interactions that formed it, and to external influences 
(Collier 2003).   
 
Cohesion also has a number of important properties which, again, Collier affords us: 
 
B1: The first basic property of cohesion is that it comes in degrees. This is a direct 
consequence of its being grounded in forces and flows, which come in varying 
kinds, dimensions and strengths. Cohesion, then, must also accommodate kinds, 
dimensions and strengths. Secondly, and following o fr m the first property 
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together with the individuating role of cohesion, B2: Cohesion must involve a 
balance of the intensities of centrifugal and centripe al forces and flows that favors 
the inward, or centripetal. Last, this balance cannot be absolute, but must be likely
over the boundaries of the cohesive entity. Just as there are intensities of forces and 
flows that must be balanced, there are, due to fluctuations, propensities of forces 
and flows that show some statistical distribution in space and time (or other 
relevant dynamical dimensions). B3: Cohesion must involve a balance of 
propensities of centrifugal and centripetal forces and flows that favors the inward, 
or centripetal. Note that the asymmetry of the balances in B1 and B2 implies a 
distinction between inner and outer, consistent with the role of cohesion in 
individuating something from its surroundings. The d rived aspects of cohesion 
now follow from the basic properties as they apply to specific systems with many 
properties. From B1, only some properties are relevant to cohesion. Thus, A1: In 
general, a dynamical system will display a mix of chesive and non-cohesive 
properties. Next, from B2 and B3, A2 Cohesion then is ot just the presence of 
interaction. Whence, A3 a property is cohesive only where there is appropriate and 
sufficient restorative interaction to stabilize it.From A1, A4: cohesiveness is 
perturbation-context dependent with system properties varying in their 
cohesiveness as perturbation kinds and strengths are v ried. Given the 
characterization of cohesion as a condition of a certain form of balance, A5: The 
interactive cohesive support of nominally system prope ties may extend across 
within-system, system-environment and within-environment interactions. 
Following from this, cohesion is not to be confined to stability of first order 
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properties like rock shape, kite; rather, A6: cohesion characterizes all properties, 
including higher order process properties, that are int raction-stabilized against 
relevant perturbations (Collier 2003) 
 
Determining cohesion is an empirical matter based on an evaluation of the forces within a 
system. So, for example, in the case of the quartz crystal, it is clear that there is a balance of 
forces such that it remains in a stable condition and retains its discernible characteristics and 
properties; namely, a particular arrangement of silicon atoms, and the balance of these forces is 
quantifiable. The opposite is true of the gas in a jar, which experiences little cohesion due to the 
nature of the forces acting between its molecules. Cohesion here is constantly breaking, and thus 
giving the gas no discernible, stable pattern. In terms of biology, especially evolutionary biology, 
cohesion mechanisms are those mechanisms which promote genetic relatedness, and therefore, 
phenotypic cohesion (Grant 2011) 
 
It is a specific kind of cohesion concept, namely one which is based on treating species as 
products of information flow, proposed by Brooks and Wiley (1986), which I argue for in the 
end. 
 
4. Paradigm shifts and the term ‘species’ 
 
It is clear from what has been said already that the concept of species has undergone a number of 
radical changes over the years in conjunction (more or less) with shifts in the theoretical 
frameworks of biology. From the Aristotelian framework through to the Darwinian, and the 
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contemporary (I acknowledge that a great deal occurred between the time of Aristotle and 
Darwin, although I use Darwin as a marker as it is because of him, most people believe, that our 
understanding of species changed the most dramatically and significantly.) We could go so far as 
to say that these changes in theoretical frameworks coincide quite well with what Kuhn would 
have called paradigm shifts. 
 
Kuhn first introduces us to his notion of paradigms in his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn 1970). He further clarifies this notion in a chapter of the book The Structure 
of Scientific Theories (Kuhn 1977), due to a large amount of confusion generated out of his 
initial book. At its most general level, a paradigm is a “disciplinary matrix” which includes a 
scientific community’s metaphysical commitments, methodological practices, symbolic 
generalisations (of the form f=ma, for instance), and exemplars. Exemplars are, for Kuhn, a more 
particular sort of paradigm, and a far more significant one in his view (Kuhn 1977). This sense of 
the term “paradigm” is derived in large part from Michael Polanyi’s work on tacit knowing, and 
focal and subsidiary knowledge (Polanyi 1962). According to Polanyi, understanding something 
involves tacit knowing, which is the awareness we have of particulars, or constituents, whilst 
attending to a comprehensive whole, without having specific knowledge of the particulars 
(Polanyi 1962). Once we shift our focus from the whole to the particulars (i.e. make the 
particulars the objects of our focal knowledge, rather than our subsidiary knowledge) we become 
incapable of performing the task (Polanyi 1962). For example, riding a bike involves a great deal 
of muscular coordination, but although we are aware of this coordination, we cannot say exactly 
how it is that each muscle works in order to explain how to ride a bike (Polanyi, 1962). Kuhn 
uses a modified version of this theory in his explication on paradigms, particularly paradigms as 
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exemplars. Scientific communities hold as part of their disciplinary matrix a great deal of 
exemplary problems, which are more or less consistent throughout the community or field (Kuhn 
1977). These are the problems which students of science are required to be able to solve as a 
matter of routine, and are the prime examples of the workings of a specific theory (Kuhn 1977). 
Kuhn suggests that exemplars such as these function to provide a kind of tacit knowledge that 
allows practitioners within a field to recognise similarities in new or novel problems and to be 
able to apply the appropriate formalism without directly relevant empirical information (Kuhn 
1977). It is this learned ability to recognise similarities between problems that makes up a 
scientific community’s subsidiary knowledge, or, in this case, their paradigm. The scientific 
equivalent, for Kuhn, of Polanyi’s shift of focus from the whole to particulars, is the quest to 
derive correspondence rules for terms or symbols within a scientific field (Kuhn 1977), 
correspondence rules being sets of criteria which determine when it is appropriate to apply a 
certain term or symbol to nature, or some particular phenomenon. Kuhn thinks that although it 
would be possible, perhaps, to come up with any number of correspondence rules for a given 
term or symbol, doing so would in fact impede the ability of practitioners to fulfil their tasks 
(Kuhn 1977). The application of this or that correspondence rule actually shifts the locus of a 
given problem, and in so doing shifts the nature of the follow up research and experiments, 
according to Kuhn (1977). Scientists are far better a  performing their tasks when symbols are 
attached to nature in an intuitive, implicit fashion, rather than an explicit one (Kuhn 1977). 
 
Having said this, one could characterise the species problem as a quest to uncover explicit 
correspondence rules for the application of the term species to this or that group of organisms. It 
is my belief, based on Kuhn’s reasoning, that this is what has led to a great deal of confusion 
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regarding the definition of species throughout the ag s, and especially today. Most, if not all, 
species concepts are explicit, hard and fast rules for applying the label of species to a given 
group of organisms. For Mayr (1992) the criteria are isolation and interbreeding. For Ghiselin 
(1987), it is competition. These definitions are operational and hence reductive in nature. They 
are operational in that they attempt to define species in terms of empirical measurement. The 
idea behind operationalism is that a theoretical term is meaningful only if we have some way of 
directly measuring its instances empirically (Chang 2009). So, in Mayr’s case, species are strictly 
those groups of organisms which exhibit interbreeding and gene flow, whether actual or 
potential. It is assumed that such concepts as gene flow and interbreeding are empirically 
testable. 
 
5. Why Mayr and Ghiselin are Operationalist 
 
Ernst Mayr (1992) and Michael Ghiselin (1987) offer definitions of species based on one (or a 
few) aspects of species evolution. For Mayr, species ar  defined by actual (or potential) degrees 
of interbreeding and gene flow (1992). For Ghiselin, the definition rests on patterns of 
competition and mate recognition (1987). It is my contention that these definitions of species are 
fundamentally operationalist (or at least, appeal to a certain species of operationalism), and 
therefore fall foul of common objections against operationalism. I will show here why I think 








Operationalism is the belief that scientific concepts must be defined in terms of the operations 
used to measure them (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). So length is defined by the way in which we 
go about measuring it. There are a number of different ways of measuring length, depending on 
scale (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). For instance, small objects (on a human scale) can be 
measured using a meter rule (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). Larger objects, on the scale of celestial 
bodies, require length or distance measurements to be made by bouncing light and measuring the 
time taken for its return (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). On a very small scale, length is almost 
meaningless in terms of how we usually understand it (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). For the 
operationalist, each of these different means of measurement represents a different concept 
(Chang 2009). Bridgman did himself recognize this as a problem and conceded that in cases 
where measurements overlap, a common name can be given for them, but only for practical 
reasons (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). 
 
The problem which interests me here is the problem of the relationship between operationalism 
and reductionism. I take it as uncontroversial that operationalism is a form of reductionism. 
Operationalists, in most cases, seek to reduce various concepts to strict empirical processes. For 
example, length is reduced simply to the method we use to determine it. There should ideally, for 
the operationalist, be a different concept for each method we use to describe various instances of 
length. This kind of reduction I believe to be ontological in nature. Concepts are reduced, in 
kind, to the various means we use to determine them. By contrast, an epistemological reduction 
of this kind would not necessarily eliminate the abstract concept of length. Rather the method, or 
operation used would function as an explanation, linking real world, practical data, with an 
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abstract concept. A useful way to illustrate this point is to imagine a class of first year undergrad 
philosophy students learning about Turing and his machine for the first time. Turing, quite 
explicitly, wanted to replace the abstract concept of thought with the operationalist definition of 
his machine. He meant nothing more by thought than t e successful playing of the imitation 
game by a machine (Turing 1950). If this machine was able to make itself indistinguishable from 
a human to another human observer, the machine was thinking (Turing 1950). However, what is 
commonly the case with undergraduates, the tendency is always there to see the successful 
playing of the imitation game by a machine as pointing o, and constituting, a broader concept of 
thought. For them it seems that the imitation game provides evidence for the existence of a 
broader notion of thought, but does not exhaust the meaning. Students persist in asking whether 
or not the machine has consciousness, or whether it is capable of creativity. They are not 
satisfied with the reduction alone. If we take seriously the purely operationalist definition, then 
there is no further question. Thought is the successful playing of the imitation game. This is a 
common objection to operationalism in general, which was put forward by Donald Gillies 
(1972). His contention was that operationalism doesn’t exhaust the meaning of a concept. If we 
take the extreme form of operationalism as being that concepts completely determined by the 
operations we use to measure them, then we cannot ask the question of whether or not they are 
valid. They are valid as a matter of tautology (Chang 2009). 
 
It is my contention that species concepts such as Myr’s and Ghiselin’s reduce species to 
operationalist (or quasi-operationalist) definitions which conflate epistemic and ontological 
models of reduction. In an attempt to square their concepts with the theory of evolution, they 
take as wholly constitutive of species certain processes, such as gene flow and interbreeding, 
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which has the almost ironic consequence of eliminating broader elements of the theory from their 
considerations. By homing in on one aspect of evolutionary theory in the search for an explicit 
definition of species, they exclude other relevant f c ors and are forced to retrofit their concepts 
by excluding various portions of the natural world, such as asexually reproducing organisms, and 
thereby end up treading the same path as the tautologica , strict operationalist definition. 
 
Let’s look at Ghiselin’s (1974) modification of the biological concept of species to illustrate my 
point. Ghiselin (1974) emphasizes competition, as an extension of the biological concept of 
species, to be a fundamental defining aspect of species. He specifies two kinds of competition, 
interspecific competition, and intraspecific competition. Interspecific competition is simply the 
competition between species for natural resources, or for the means of survival (Ghiselin 1974). 
Intraspecific competition is the competition between members of the same species for genetic 
resources (Ghiselin 1974). This presupposes interbre ding and as only those organisms which 
can interbreed would be able to compete for genetic r sources. This kind of competition he also 
terms ‘reproductive competition’. Thus species can be defined as follows: “They are the most 
extensive units in the natural economy such that reproductive competition occurs among their 
parts” [Ghiselin 1974; 538]. This definition is reductive in nature. It reduces species to degrees 
of reproductive competition, even, famously, to theexclusion of asexual organisms. Ghiselin 
(1974) expands on his concept with an analogy with the normal economy. Species, he says, are 
like firms, who compete with each other, i.e. between firms, and who have internal competition 
between members. Like in the normal economy, Ghiselin says, there are firms, constituted by 
lots of members, and there are also individual tradesmen, who are not themselves firms, but part 
of the economy nonetheless (1974). Individual tradesmen, so the analogy goes, are asexual 
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organisms who participate in the economy, but do not interact with each other in such a way as 
to constitute a whole. 
 
Mayr’s (1992) species concept (the Biological species concept, as it is commonly known) is 
perhaps the most widely known and used species concept of all. It is basically the same as 
Ghiselin’s. In fact, Ghiselin’s is primarily an extnsion of Mayr’s concept, extended in order to 
deal with issues such as potential interbreeding2. For Mayr, species are populations which 
interbreed successfully, or have the potential to interbreed successfully, and which are 
reproductively isolated from one another (1992). The problems with both these species concepts 
are numerous, yet they persist as the concept of choice for a number of reasons. Firstly, they do 
work for most common cases. Secondly, they are based on theory, to a certain degree, and 
therefore conform with a modern, naturalistic understanding of species. The problems arise when 
one begins to consider the theory of evolution as awhole, and not just in terms of gene flow or 
isolation or competition. 
 
Other species concepts exist which are equally operationalist (and therefore reductive) as the two 
already mentioned. Paterson (1985) postulated what he called the mate recognition concept of 
species. 
 
I will begin my analysis of these concepts in terms of operationalism by considering the first 
reason why such concepts are so widely accepted and employed: they work (most of the time). 
                                                           
2
 Potential interbreeding isn’t a problem if we treat species as competing organisms, as it doesn’t 
matter whether or not certain organisms are interbre ding, so long as they are competing with 
one another, which Ghiselin maintains is happening constantly. What matters is whether or not 
organisms are competing reproductively, or merely for survival 
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How are we to judge whether such a concept might work? What are the standards to which we 
must hold all concepts of species? Surely the answer is theory. The theory of evolution (whether 
Darwinian or otherwise) was developed to explain (among other things) various patterns 
observed in nature; patterns of order and diversity wi hin the natural world. I will assume, for the 
time being, that species are real, and that they ar individuals. Mayr himself believes this too, so 
even if I am wrong about it, at least I am attacking Mayr on his own terms3. There are many 
good reasons for believing in the reality of species, which modern understandings of the theory 
of evolution reveal quite convincingly. Species appear to be groups of organisms which display 
degrees of complexity and organization which makes th  reduction of them impossible in a lot of 
cases (Collier 2010; Gabbay 2011). This is a result of a growing body of knowledge of different 
evolutionary mechanisms, the interactions between which make the possibility of reduction more 
and more untenable. Nevertheless, if we deny the reality of the species category, then we must 
find some other units upon which the forces of evoluti n operate, whether these be individual 
organisms, or genes, or something else. If this is the case, then the perceived structure and order 
in the natural world is merely epiphenomenal; a perceived pattern which has no reality of its 
own, and is wholly reducible to forces acting below it. As I have contended, Mayr appears to be 
a reductionist about species, though he does assert their reality. As I see it, this is problematic for
Mayr, and is where the relevance of theory is best displayed. The Biological species concept 
must be taken to be, if we maintain that species ar real, as fitting with our intuitions about what 
species must look like, that is, cohesive entities making up the patterns of similarity and diversity 
within the natural world. Famously, the Biological species concept rejects the status of asexual 
                                                           
3
 This does not mean that I take their concepts to be highly unhelpful. Being initially based in the 
theory itself, the biological species concept shows itself to be highly useful in many cases of 
species delineation. I am simply drawing the comparison in order to illustrate certain tendencies 
which resemble operationalism, and in so doing open up the concept to particular weaknesses 
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organisms as species, despite the fact that they display a large degree of apparent cohesion; they 
display patterns which are not unlike those observed within sexually reproducing organisms. 
This fact, along with a growing knowledge base of mechanisms which can maintain the integrity 
of genetic and phenotypic similarity without the need for gene flow or interbreeding, make the 
Biological species concept increasingly redundant, d force it into a realm of a self-validating 
tautology.       
 
The move towards operationalism is one solution to the pattern versus process problem (Collier 
et al. 1996). The problem is one of finding a bridge between perceived pattern in the natural 
world, and the dynamics, or processes, which cause the patterns. Processes are inherently 
unobservable, raising questions of their existence (Collier et al. 1996). This is exactly the 
concern that led Bridgman to adopt his operationalist view concerning theory in physics (Chang 
2009). The Harvard physicist became aware of the problem after reading Einstein on the Theory 
of General Relativity, and saw that there was one operation required for judging the simultaneity 
of two events separated by space, and another for judging simultaneity when the events were in 
the same place. One could not fix one by fixing the other (Chang 2009). This led Bridgman to 
the conclusion that physicists had been too liberal in their extension of concepts to different 
experimental values (such as mass, velocity etc), which required different operations (Chang 
2009; Gillies 1972). His most famous example is that of the seemingly innocuous concept of 
length (see earlier discussion). Bridgman contented that there is no reason to assume that these 
two instances of length (length as measured by meter rul s, and length as measured by bouncing 
signals) represent the same concept. We have no way of accurately correlating the two (given the 
practical impossibility of constructing a row of meter rules between two celestial bodies). Things 
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become even more troublesome when dealing in units of light years, where the operation used 
becomes ever more sophisticated and complex. The sam applies for very small objects, such as 
subatomic particles, where the concept of length can hardly be seen to have meaning in the same 
way that it does on larger scales. For these reasons Bridgman believed that we have different 
concepts for different instances of length depending o  the operation used to determine it. He 
conceded that for practical reasons scientists could speak of length across operational divides as 
being the same concept, provided that we end up with mutually consistent numerical results in 
the case of an overlap (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972) 
 
This problem of fixing concepts is nowhere more evid nt than in biology, and especially in the 
species problem. One could draw an analogy between units of mass and units of species, one 
being a fundamental unit in mechanics, the other a fundamental unit of evolution. Leaving aside 
issues of commensurability, the concept of mass has different meanings in different theories of 
mechanics (Newtonian, Einsteinian etc). In the same way, the concept of species must be 
determined by the theory in which it is employed. This is the very reason why operationalism has 
failed in physics. One of the key objections raised against it is its supposed circularity. All 
operationalist definitions of concepts presuppose th ory (Chang 2009; Gillies 1972). It is 
unclear, as Bridgman suggests, how we move from operationalist definitions of concepts to the 
theories in which they consist. One cannot make sense of length without presupposing theory; 
theory about, say, how we measure the length of a meter. If we measure length by using a meter 
rule, we are presupposing that a theory in which it makes sense to use a meter rule to measure 
length, or, in more extreme cases, why the result of a measurement made by a meter rule is 
length itself. The actual lengths and units used in measurement are here unimportant as they can 
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be fixed by mere stipulation. But even here, the stipulation of a length requires a theory of length 
which is prior to the operation, or else it is viciously circular. 
 
Of course, as Gillies has pointed out, unless the operation itself exhausts the entire meaning of 
the concept, or theory, and is so true by convention or tautology, then we need not require any 
theory (Gillies 1972). If it does not, then it must cohere in some way with a broader 
understanding of the concept which is fixed in the t ory. This tension is inescapable unless we 
adopt the untenable position of operations exhausting meaning. Bridgman himself was reluctant 
to postulate this view (that operations exhaust meaning). 
 
The same troubles arise when dealing with species, and it is my contention that fundamentally 
operationalist concepts of species have led to a superficial understanding of them, and given rise 
to the confusions embodied in the species problem. 
  
Pattern is highly observable (compared to process), but insufficient for the practice of 
quantitative science and its role in explanation (Collier et al. 1996). Historically, responses to the
problem have gone two ways: either extreme micro-reduction, a la operationalism, or the 
division of biology into explanatory fields such asevolutionary biology, and descriptive, or 
comparative fields such as taxonomy (Collier et al. 1996). Both these moves have proven 
inadequate for understanding the exact nature of species. Operationalism results in selectively 
ignoring certain forces at play within evolution, ad hence eliminating various parts of the entire 
living world. This is easy to see in the case of Mayr (1992). By having species be only those 
things which do, or can possibly, interbreed, one eliminates, asexual populations from being 
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included as species. This is problematic given thatasexual populations often display similar 
cohesive characteristics to sexually reproducing ones. To eliminate them seems like a fairly 
arbitrary move, and is inadequate for a more comprehensive understanding of how the living 
world evolves. 
 
It is my contention (as well as others, such as Collier, Wiley, Brooks, etc) that any attempt at 
reducing species to explicit correspondence rules, such as operationalism, is doomed to failure if 
we hold that species are dynamical, complex systems exhibiting varying degrees of cohesion (the 
property which individuates dynamical systems). Such systems contain a mixture of forces and 
flows which interact in a non-linear fashion, making reduction to lower levels in the hierarchy 
often impossible, even in principle. 
 
When I speak of reduction in this biological context, I am talking strictly about ontological 
reduction, that is, the reduction of a certain biological entity, to entities at a lower level. The 
common example is the reduction of an organism to its basic molecules. It is assumed in 
reductionism that all higher level properties, e.g. properties at an organismic level or fully 
explainable and, hence, describable, by properties at a lower level, e.g. molecular interactions. 
Higher level properties are said to supervene on lower level ones, which means that there can be 
no change in the higher level property without there being some change in the lower level 
(Kincaid, 1988). All of these issues of reduction and supervenience are controversial, and I will 
avoid going into them other than to explain the view that certain biological entities are not 
reducible, remembering that the implication for this irreducibility is the impossibility of strict 
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and explicit definition, whether it be operational or otherwise. The link between irreducibility 
and explicit definition is best expressed by Collier (2003 105) 
 
Explicit definitions place the defined term on only one side of the definition, so that 
all explicitly defined concepts are in principle eliminable. For example, if bachelors 
are unmarried adult males, by definition, we need not suppose that there are these 
things, bachelors, in addition to unmarried adult males. Requiring explicit 
definitions of irreducible phenomena implies that the concepts of these phenomena, 
at least, can be reduced to the concepts in their definitions. If the concepts refer to 
dynamically irreducible phenomena, and the definitio s are in dynamical terms, 
then the definitions presuppose dynamical reducibility. A requirement of explicit 
definitions for all dynamical phenomena in terms of simpler phenomena would rule 
out, a priori, nonreducible complex phenomena. 
 
Of course, not all dynamical systems are irreducible, and it is useful here to distinguish between 
weak and strong emergence, and weak and strong cohesion. Weakly emergent properties are 
properties in higher-level domains which arise from lower-level domains in a way which is 
unexpected, but which are nevertheless reducible, in principle, to the lower-domain (Chalmers 
2006). Properties which are strongly emergent are also unexpected, but are in principle not 
reducible to properties in the lower domain (Chalmers 2006). So, certain dynamical systems 
exhibit higher levels which are still deducible from lower levels, such as ion crystals, whose 
properties are wholly explainable in terms of the ionic bonds. With species, the degree of 
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reducibility depends on the amount and kind of cohesion present, and hence the degree of non-
linearity in the system. 
 
6. Is it appropriate to treat species like dynamical systems? 
 
A dynamical system is simply a system which is governed by forces and flows (Collier 2010; 
Wiley & Brooks 1988). It is a causal system. Not all c usal systems are complex, or non-linear. 
Some are reducible, and others are not. A kite on a string is dynamical, but is not complex 
enough that it cannot be reduced to its component parts. A change say, in the integrity of the 
string, or in the interaction between the movement of wind with the fabric of the kite, will result 
in significant changes to the kite-on-string’s cohesion. Complexly organised dynamical systems, 
however, are largely insensitive to fluctuations at lower levels (Collier 2010; Wiley & Brooks 
1988). For instance, a human being, at the organismal level, is not greatly affected by 
perturbations at a molecular, or cellular level. We undergo changes in our chemistry, without 
fundamentally damaging the integrity of our functional cohesion. The thesis I have put forward, 
as I have said before, is that species are like human beings. They are individuals, and they are 
dynamical. We know they are dynamical because they ar  entities fundamentally exhibiting 
forces and flows; forces of gene flow, genetic drift, ecology, development (and whatever else), 
and it is these forces which contribute to their distinct identities. What keeps a species the way it 
is (its apparent difference from species around it, whether physical, or behavioural) is determined 
by the relative strengths of those forces. Members of a species tend to have the same 
characteristics because they share largely the samegen s, which they maintain by interbreeding 
(Mayr 1992; Mayr & Provine 1981). In cases where spcies are in fact capable of interbreeding, 
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but do not, such forces as mate recognition, or ecology come into play. Examples of this are lions 
and tigers, which are capable of producing viable offspring, but which don’t due to ecological 
and geographical separateness. 
 
7. Information  
 
Information, generally, is a contested concept in the field of physics, and thus also in biology. 
There is an abundance of mathematical definitions of inf rmation which function well in certain 
contexts and not so well in others. It is fairly unco troversial to state that information exists in 
biology, and especially within species. Genes are, fundamentally, carriers of information which 
determine protein synthesis in organisms (Collier 2011; Adriaans & Benthem 2008; Smith 
2000), and genes are one of the most important aspects of species. Whether or not genes are the 
only mode of information transfer in species is debata le, but what is not debatable is that they 
are the most important (Collier 2008).  How does biological information work? Drawing on 
Collier (Collier 2008), there are two kinds of information which we must distinguish in order to 
understand it clearly: instrumental and substantive information. Instrumental information is the 
information which is measured as a useful tool in various scientific pursuits (Collier cites 
bandwidth etc.). A common example of instrumentalist uses of information is in tree rings. The 
size and frequency of tree rings give human observers the ability to deduce certain things about 
the trees past. This information, however, is not intrinsic or vital to the tree itself. It is only 
relevant to human observers (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny 2008; Collier 2008).  Substantive 
information, on the other hand, is information which makes a difference within a system without 
it necessarily being measured (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny 2008; Collier 2008). An example 
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might be genes themselves, whose information is vital to the functioning of the organism which 
it inhabits.  In other words, even if we didn’t measure the information contained within a certain 
gene, it is still causally relevant to the organism itself (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny 2008; Collier 
2008). Such substantive information exists, according to Collier, in a nested hierarchy, working 
down from the most inclusive (It from bit) to intenionality. This hierarchy is nested as it each 
level contains the properties of the level before, but with modifications which exclude other 
elements in the previous level (Collier 2008). 
 
At the most inclusive level, as stated before, is the It from bit notion of information (Collier 
2008). This view simply states that any causally grounded distinction makes a difference, and is 
therefore information (Collier 2008). This view arose out of quantum mechanics, and the term 
was coined by John Wheeler (1990). It basically means that every causal distinction arises out of 
information, or itself contains information. Its (things in the world) are derived from bits of 
information which determines their existence and the states in which they appear (Collier 2008). 
A refinement of this view is negentropy, which is the view that only things (or Its) which can do 
work (channelling energy, or what have you) can be considered information. Everything else is 
noise (Collier 2008). This view is bound up in the notion that if we subtract all of the constraints 
from a system (having H(Act)) we end up with a system having H(Max), that is, the removal of 
internal constraints on a system maximises its entropy, or takes it from its actual entropy, to 
maximum entropy (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny 2008; Wiley & Brooks 1988; Collier 2008). Thus, 
negentropy is the organising factor within a system, which constrains its phase states. Beneath, 
or within, negentropy is hierarchical information (Collier 2008). Here information travels via 
channels to different levels in a hierarchy. This hierarchy is real, or natural, by virtue of its doing 
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something. Purely abstract, or nominal hierarchies might be th  physical, the chemical, the 
biological, the social, the psychological and the social (Collier 2011). None of these elements in 
the hierarchy is physical or causal elements. They do not do anything. By contrast, an atom, 
which is part of a cell, which is part of an organism, is a real hierarchy in that behaviour at the 
atomic level has a causal impact on what happens at the cellular level and so on (Collier 2011). 
According to Collier (2011), each level of the hierarchy must exhibit its own cohesion, that is, it 
must be its own functional, dynamically individuated self (see my earlier account of what 
cohesion is). Each of these cohesive levels transmits information to higher levels in the 
hierarchy. Negentropy is obviously involved here because it is this which gives a level its 
organisation, or cohesion4. It is as obviously true that not all forms of negentropic information 
are hierarchical. 
 
From here we venture further down the informational hierarchy into functional information, and 
then into intentionality (Collier 2008). It will not be necessary, for my purposes, to go deeper. 
All that is important is that we recognize that biological systems such as species are 
fundamentally information systems, which exist in an information hierarchy (Collier 2008). This 
hierarchy extends from the atomic level, up to the cellular, to the organismal, and to the species 
(beyond this we have ecological systems). 
 
It may be necessary here to say something about how species can be considered a real level. As I 
have said, in order for something to be real, or natural, it has to (be able to) do something. So 
what is it, exactly, that species do? My argument, as well as that of others before and 
                                                           
4
 This is a controversial statement. Brooks and Wiley (1988) assert that organization and 
cohesion within a level is the result of entropic, not negentropic processes. 
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contemporaneous to me, is that species play a fundament l role in the theory of evolution 
(Paterson, 1980; Hull 1978; Ghiselin 1974; Wiley & Brooks 1988; Sober 1980; Mayr 1992; 
Ghiselin 1987; Templeton 1989; Richards 2010; Ereshefsky 1992). So long as we take evolution 
to be true, we must take species to be real. In other words, the function of the species is to 
speciate and give us greater diversity. The forces of evolution thus far posited do not act on 
individual organisms, or on specific parent-offspring lineages, but on a collection of organisms 
which is organized in such a way as to be susceptibl  to changes in the various forces at work. 
The theory of evolution was proposed to explain diversity, and it is species (as the fundamental 
units of evolution), which are its carriers. 
 
Another way to approach this problem is by referring to species as largely emergent entities5. A  
emergent and non-reducible, species cannot be dealt with by focus on lower levels of 
interactions, i.e. specific organismal interactions. I will deal with specific cases shortly, but for 
now it will be enough to claim that whatever is emergent is real, as emergent properties 
themselves are dynamical, not just in the sense that they are held together by dynamical forces, 
but that they themselves exhibit causal effects on things around them, as well as on their lower 
levels (Collier 2008). Species are real levels in the information hierarchy because their properties 
cannot be dealt with by reference to lower levels. If a certain population of organisms in a certain 
location exhibits properties (such as all having a particular set of characters, or behaving in a 
                                                           
5
 It is necessary here to distinguish between weakly nd strongly emergent properties of systems. 
Strongly emergent properties are in principle irreducible to lower level activity, as well as being 
unexpected given lower levels. Weakly emergent properties are unexpected, although reducible. 
Such emergent properties we could say are epiphenomal. Not all entities which look like 
species will, therefore, be species. In some cases cohesion may be reducible to one or two 
(linear) interactions between forces, which can be reduced. The advantage of the cohesion 
concept, however, is that it gives us the framework f  dealing with such cases. 
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particular way, or interbreeding only with each other (interestingly, this point has been used as a 
criticism of Mayr’s biological species concept in tha  gene flow and interbreeding are properties 
of cohesive species, and therefore not the cause of their cohesiveness)) which is not explainable 
by any one specific evolutionary force, then it must be treated macroscopically. This 
macroscopic entity interacts with its environment (as a whole) as well as with its lower levels to 




A real level in any information hierarchy has to have a number of different pathways through 
which it receives information from lower levels. Up to now we have been talking about 
evolutionary forces acting on a locus to produce a ohesive entity called a species. I think a more 
accurate portrayal of this picture is to imagine thse various forces as acting on the flow of 
information from lower levels to higher ones. If we have a look at the known forces involved in 
evolution today (gene flow, genetic drift, natural selection, development, ecology, etc.), each of 
these has some role to play in the transmission of inf rmation, either directly or indirectly, 
thereby impacting constraints on information flow. The most obvious of these channels is 
involved during gene flow, and it is argued (by many, i cluding Collier) that this is probably the 
most important factor when it comes to maintaining species cohesion. The reason for this is so 
obvious as to almost resist explanation (Smith 2000). Genes are carriers of information in that 
they are codes which carry instructions for the building of an organism during ontogenesis. This 
information is passed from parents to the next generation via sexual reproduction. A high degree 
of gene flow within a population (that is, a high degree of interbreeding between all members of 
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the population) maintains cohesion by ensuring that a majority of the genes from that population 
is passed down into the next, therefore maintaining identity and a shared evolutionary fate 
(Barker 2007). Natural selection impacts this information flow over generations by eliminating 
those pieces of code (or genes) which do not survive environmental stresses (Barker 2007). Not 
all of the genes in a given population have an equal likelihood of reaching the next generation. If 
they did, the entropy of the system would be maximal. N tural selection, however, ensures that 
only those genes which increase an organism’s likelihood of reproducing will be passed on. 
Natural selection places a restriction on the phase space of a species system, lowering its 
entropy, and thereby acting as a controlling/organising factor. 
 
This is not where the buck stops with regard to infrmation channels, however. There is also an 
interesting interaction between genes and their phenotypes, which places further restrictions on 
the transfer of information to the macroscopic, or species, level, as Collier (2008; 773) states: 
 
The route from information stored and transmitted from DNA to the phenotype of 
an organism is much more complex than the replication of genetic information in 
reproduction. Replication is fairly well understood, but gene expression, especially 
in multicellular eukaryotes, is very complex and not very direct 
 
There is not a one to one relationship between genes a d phenotypes. The process, as Collier 
states, is extremely complex, and clarity is difficult to come across on the topic. Suffice to say 
there are certain well known examples of mechanisms which demonstrate this complexity, and 
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which show how constraints are placed on the information transfer from gene to realised trait. 
One such example is the Baldwin Effect. 
 
The Baldwin Effect is an evolutionary mechanism which was discovered in the late 19th century. 
Three separate researchers stumbled upon it indepenntly, James Baldwin amongst them 
(Simpson 1952). The effect, or mechanism, is one in which characters acquired during an 
organism’s life span (called accommodations) that are, by definition, non-hereditary, become 
reinforced or replaced by genetic or hereditary characters. This is, essentially, a version of the 
Lamarckian view of acquired traits becoming hereditary traits. It is a mechanism that has 
garnered a large amount of controversy, not because it i  not true, but because it is difficult to 
find definitive cases of it. As Simpson (1952) states, all of the necessary factors required for it to
work do in fact exist and occur. The difficulty is in finding cases where one can say for certain 
that the Baldwin Effect took place, and not just standard natural selection. For instance, it is 
obvious that accommodations exist, by the banal fact that muscles increase in size through 
frequent use (Simpson 1952). We also know that there are strong correspondences between some 
of these accommodations, and heritable, genetic effects. The example that Simpson cites it 
Goldschmidt’s phenocopies, which are copies of genetic traits by other organisms without a 
change in heredity. The existence of phenocopies, according to Simpson, implies the existence of 
genocopies too, which are copies of non-genetic traits by a change in heredity. The way the 
mechanism is supposed to work is that accommodations, or acquired traits, increase the fitness of 
members of the population who have the ability to acquire this trait. Over time, this trait begins 
to appear in the population as a genetic or innate tr it. The problem is with determining whether 
or not the trait was actually wholly acquired from the environment, or whether it was a part of 
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the genotype in the first place, which perhaps never reached expression due to environmental 
factors. 
 
What makes the second possibility plausible is the work done by Waddington (Waddington 
1942) on canalization. The theory of canalization is used to explain evolutionary robustness, that 
is, the tendency for lineages to maintain their identities despite changes in environment. 
Waddington used this theory to explain experiments done on Drosophila pupae, which he 
subjected to heat shock in early stages of development. This heat shock caused a crossveinless 
phenotype to emerge in some specimens (one can equate the heat shock and the emerging 
phenotype to the appearance of an accommodation or acquired trait in Baldwin’s sense). 
Waddington subsequently selected for specimens which d splayed this phenotype. Over a 
number of generations, going through the same process, the Drosophila pupae began to be born 
with the crossveinless phenotype, without being subjected to the heat shock. Waddington 
proposed the idea that the crossveinless phenotype always existed in the Drosophila pupae 
within its genetic makeup as a potential phenotype, but because of environmental factors 
(canalization) it never reached expression. Only an extreme environmental pressure, and 
selection, led to its emergence as a perceived innate tr it. He likened canalization to a stone 
rolling down a hill, in a deep canal with high walls. This is the journey of the genotype to 
expression in the phenotype. There are a number of potential phenotypes that can be realized, but 
due to canalization, development always travels down a reasonably similar path. This then 
ensures that the identity (or cohesion) of the species an remain intact despite environmental 
shift. Only extreme environmental pressures (such as a heat shock in early development) can 
cause a change in this developmental trajectory. Waddington himself defined the phenomenon as 
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follows " the capacity to produce a particular definite end-result in spite of a certain variability 
both in the initial situation from which development starts and in the conditions met with during 
its course" (Waddington 1975; 99). In terms of the Baldwin effect, canalization may give us a 
better understanding of innateness. Ariew (1996), who takes his cue from Lorenz, states that 
canalization gives us a more accurate picture of the dichotomy between innate and acquired 
traits. As he states: 
 
This makes Waddington's idea a good candidate for an account of innateness: the 
degree to which a biological trait is innate for a genotype is the degree to which a 
developmental pathway for individuals possessing an instance of that genotype is 
canalized. The degree to which a developmental pathway is canalized is the degree 
to which it is bound to produce the end-state regardless of environmental variation 
in either (a) its initial state, or (b) during the course of development (1996).   
 
For the Baldwin effect this could mean that instead of viewing the mechanism as a move from 
acquired trait to genetic trait, we could say that all traits are inherently genetic, but that due to 
canalization, only a few reach expression, but thatis can change in the face of environmental 
pressures. There will be, of course, non-genetic, acquired traits arising in individuals (say, for 
arguments sake, the chopping off of a mouse’s tail). Such traits don’t become heritable because 
they are not genetic. It is still the case the heredity occurs through genes. If the genotype doesn’t 




Some extreme views within the field of developmental biology wish to remove the dichotomy 
between environment and genes altogether. Some (namely, Griffiths and Gray 1994) make the 
claim that evolution is best understood as “... [the] differential replication of total development 
processes or life cycles” (1994). The distinction between replicators and interactors can no 
longer be maintained, they argue, and must be replac d by looking at development as a whole 
(1994). Whatever the case may be, whether we can safely divide genetic and environmental 
factors, I think the important thing to realise is the complexity involved in genotype to phenotype 
translation, which acts, from an information perspectiv , as an information channel, and how this 
information channel has the potential to act as maintainer of cohesion. The importance of 
development in maintaining species cohesion may not simply be secondary in importance to 
gene flow or interbreeding. Some (Gould among them) would go so far as to say that gene flow 
is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for maintaining a species. If the evidence for this proves 
conclusive, we have a very strong case for rejecting Mayr’s Biological species concept, and for 
accepting the Cohesion concept as an alternative. Matthew Barker (2006) in his paper The 
Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow wishes to make just such a case. For 
him, gene flow is certainly not the primary maintaier of a species’ identity over time, although 
it certainly could be. Barker asserts, rightly, that the current hegemonic view of species is one 
which privileges gene flow and interbreeding over other factors in maintaining species cohesion. 
The cohesiveness of species is largely taken for granted in recent times (we can equate this with 
the consensus view that species are, after all, individuals and not classes). The problem becomes, 
what is the nature of species cohesion? For those such as Mayr and Ghiselin, interbreeding and 
gene flow is paramount. Gene flow works by ensuring that the greatest number of genes from a 
given population make it into the next generation. The more genes from one population which 
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make it into the subsequent population, the more similar that subsequent population will be to the 
prior population as a whole. Therefore, a distinct identity (cohesion) is maintained. On this 
thinking, if an isolation event occurs, such as a ch nge in geography (let’s imagine a river forms, 
dividing the population in two), the genes from one side of the river cannot flow to the other side 
(I’m assuming that this is not an aerial species, and cannot cross water. Or perhaps the river is 
wide enough and turbulent enough that even species capable of swimming could not). If 
something such as genetic drift (or a new selection pressure) were to occur in a population on 
one side of the river, the lack of gene flow with the other side would mean that there would be 
nothing to maintain their similarity. Those new novel genes don’t make it across to the other side 
to keep subsequent generation looking the same. What Barker presents in his paper, however, is 
evidence to suggest that even without gene flow (in populations which are not restricted, 
physically, from interbreeding) species identity is maintained. There are also cases in which 
large amounts of gene flow are not enough to maintain species identity, and cohesion is broken 
via other factors. I will cite Barker for some examples below. 
 
Colonies of the butterfly Euphydryas editha, for example, were found scattered 
through California with distances of up to 200 km separating them, and yet gene 
flow between colonies was nearly zero when gaps between them measured as little 






Moving to sexually reproducing plants, there is even greater evidence of gene flow 
being unnecessary for species cohesion. Typically, either wind or insect pollination 
facilitates sexual reproduction in plants. One might assume that wind facilitates 
reproduction over vast distances, “but this assumption is not borne out by the 
available data” (1229). For example, outcrossing in Zea mays (corn) is only 1% at 
distances greater than 18 m, and in Beta vulgaris (beets) is just 0.3% at distances 
beyond 200 m; likewise among Coulter pines, successful dispersal does not reach 
far beyond 10m (Ehrlich and Raven 1969, 1229). Consequently, Futuyma (1998, 
317) has summarized that “a large number of crop species have shown that fields 
separated by a kilometer or more are effectively isolated in most cases.” (Barker 
2006) 
 
What this clearly demonstrates is that certain species, even when they are within breeding range, 
sometimes don’t interbreed, yet still maintain a distinct, cohesive identity. More data that Barker 
reveals shows that there are even cases where specie  do nterbreed rather extensively, yet this is 
not sufficient to hold the species together as a cohesive entity. 
For instance: 
 
Templeton’s (1989) work shows even high rates of gene flow between populations 
can fail to bring populations into a cohesive whole. This is clearest in the case of 
syngameons, which are collections of what most biologists would consider to be 
populations of distinct species. Despite being of dif erent species, however, 
populations in a syngameon collective frequently overcome pre-zygotic 
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reproductive barriers. Thus, there is gene flow betwe n distinct species in the 
syngameon, and yet this is insufficient, even over significant periods of 
‘evolutionary time’, to unify the corresponding species, populations, and organisms 
into one unit that displays a single instance of species cohesion. (Barker 2006). 
 
So, where does this leave the Biological species concept? In a rather precarious position. It is 
clear from the above that gene flow is neither necessary, nor sufficient for species cohesion. Of 
course, this in no way discredits gene flow as a vit l aspect of species cohesion6. It simply makes 
the case that to posit gene flow and isolation as primary factors in the definition of species is 
misguided, and fails to take into account, even by simple inspection of the literature, the true 
complexity of the evolutionary picture. 
 
8. Naturalized Metaphysics 
 
Throughout this thesis, in my grappling with the species problem, I have been primarily 
concerned with one area of philosophy, and that is metaphysics. The species problem is first and 
foremost a metaphysical problem. It involves all those elements and topics which have been at 
the heart of metaphysical discourse for many hundreds, and even thousands, of years; things such 
as identity over time, whole-parts relations, indivi uals versus classes, realism vs. nominalism. 
While all of these problems are in some way related, hey are distinct problems, and all of them 
are present when dealing with the species problem. I have shown throughout this thesis how both 
                                                           
6
 An important point to remember is that the Cohesion c cept by no means wants to remove 
gene flow from the species problem dialogue, but rather, it wants to place it within a context in 
which other forces function to maintain species identity 
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antiquated and contemporary species concepts fail in some way because of problematic 
metaphysical assumptions, whether it were Aristotle’s essentialism and classes-based ontology, 
or Mayr’s reductionist operationalism.  All of our species concepts up till now have suffered to 
varying degrees because of residual unchallenged metaphysical assumptions from previous eras. 
In this chapter my aim is to outline the core metaphysical concepts which have guided me to my 
conclusions about species. I will discuss a new approach to metaphysics which rejects the a 
priori nit-picking of most analytical metaphysics, and proposes that philosophy does more to 
align itself with current, testable science. Much of my thinking about this has been drawn from 
Ladyman et al.’s book Every Thing Must Go (2007), and so I will be referring to it quite 
extensively. As a helpful starting point to their ideas I provide the following quote: 
 
It is Ladyman et al’s claim that modern metaphysics ha  become woefully isolated 
from actual science. Metaphysicians are left arguin over issues long resolved by 
actual science. For instance, Ladyman et al draw attention to the debate amongst 
over the nature of matter, specifically the nature of matter as either ‘gunk’ (in the 
sense of an infinitely divisible substance) or atoms (atoms being partless particles). 
This debate, according to Ladyman et al, ‘is essentially being conducted in the 
same terms as it was by the pre-Socratic philosophers among whom the atomists 
were represented by Democritus and the gunkists by Anaxagoras...It is preposterous 
that in spite of the developments in the scientific understanding of matter that have 
occurred since then, contemporary metaphysicians blithely continue to suppose that 
the dichotomy between atoms and gunk remains relevant, and that it can be 




Here we have a good summation of the problem. Much analytic metaphysics has failed to make 
progress because it fails to engage with what is really going on in the scientific world. This is, 
essentially, the core of my critique of modern species oncepts, but I will deal with this in more 
detail later. For now let us unpack the idea of Naturalized Metaphysics. 
 
The idea of a naturalized metaphysics is nothing new. Naturalism is found in the thinking of 
many philosophers exploring concepts like identity, time, space, etc. throughout the history of 
western philosophy. Two notable examples of this are John Locke, and Wilfred Sellars. Both of 
these philosophers advocated in some way the practice of metaphysics by way of empirical, or 
scientific, knowledge. Probably Sellars’ most well known idea is that of the distinction between 
his two images of the world, i.e. the Manifest image, and the Scientific image. Loosely speaking 
the Manifest image of the world is the one which man employs by way of common, or instinctual 
sense [1]. It is, according to Sellars “the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of 
himself as man-in-the-world” (Sellars 1963). At the centre of the Manifest image are people and 
things (deVries 2011). It is in employing this framework that we navigate our world on an 
everyday basis. Contrasting with this image of the world is the Scientific image. The 
nomenclature of these images is misleading as the Manifest image needn’t be unscientific, 
although it is more promiscuous in its methodology than the Scientific image. What makes the 
Scientific image scientific is not necessarily its methodology, but rather the fact that it is based 
on the content of actual, practiced science; that is, the real theories and empirical data that 




Sellars is not a strong advocate for the Manifest image, as he says, “[The Manifest] image, in so 
far as it pertains to man, is a 'false' image; this fal ity threatens man himself, inasmuch as he is, 
in an important sense, the being which has this image of himself” (1963). Instead, he defends the 
Scientific image. He acknowledges the possibility of b th being in some ways correct, but 
dismisses it on grounds which I shall not go into here. Essentially, Sellars believes our pursuits 
as philosophers should not be aimed at ascertaining truths through the Manifest image, but rather 
by “knowing our way around” the sciences and the Sci ntific image. 
 
A useful analogue to Sellars’ images is given to us by Ladyman et. al. (2007). They speak about 
the “domestication” of the hard sciences as being the dominant practice of metaphysicians up till 
now. What this practice consists of is translating, or making sense of, our theoretical progress in 
the sciences in terms of common sense, or folk, understandings of the world (2007). This 
practice, they feel, is misguided, the result of which has been a lack of progress and 
understanding in the field of metaphysics. Our intuitions very rarely match up with the science. 
For instance, a common sense understanding of matter is that it consists of smaller and smaller 
bits of other matter. So elements are comprised of at ms, which we see as nuclei orbited by 
electrons (in much the same way as the moon orbits the earth), and these atoms are comprised of 
other smaller bits, which are in turn comprised of other smaller bits. The science of subatomic 
particles, however, shows that atoms and their constituents are not anything like matter in the 
way we conventionally understand it. Subatomic particles do not break down into smaller parts 
in the same way that a building breaks down into bricks and steel. The subatomic world is 
something which eludes a common sense understanding. It s so strange that attempts to visualize 
it are often impossible to most people. A possible explanation for this is that human beings did 
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not evolve to have an understanding of the atomic or subatomic realm. We evolved to deal with 
objects and things at a human scale (2007). Our intitions about the behavior of things at this 
scale work fairly well most of the time, but when it comes to very small or very large objects, 
our common sense fails us dismally. 
 
Collier (2010b) has argued that one could make a case for reconciling these two images. While 
this may initially sound problematic for my position, I will show here that it in fact strengthens 
it, mainly because it demonstrates a methodological approach which naturalism must adopt when 
comparing two competing paradigms. 
 
Collier (2010b) argues that the Sellars’ two images are instances of distinct paradigms in the 
Kuhnian sense. Reconciling these images requires that we make explicit the tacit assumptions in 
each so that we can compare them (Collier 2010b). He also argues that neither image can be 
justified by its own standards, and that criticisms of each generally come from the other, 
according to the standards and framework of the othr (2010b). I am agnostic regarding whether 
or not the images are, in fact, reconcilable. What I t ke as important in Collier’s argument is the 
claim that tacit assumptions must be made explicit in order for us to compare them. This 
methodology is distinct from the misguided methodolgy of previous metaphysicians who 
simply try to translate the Scientific Image into the Manifest Image. This process of explication 
is an essential part of a naturalistic framework, as it reflects the empirical impulse which is the 
cornerstone of naturalism. It is my belief that just a  a naturalistic metaphysician must try to 
make the necessary connections between various scientifi  fields, he must also always be aware 
of the possibility of reconciling common sense and scientific concepts, so long as the 
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methodology is a suitable one. A truly naturalistic metaphysics must remain agnostic regarding 
the reconcilability of the two images. This possibility of reconciliation is a hallmark of 
naturalistic metaphysics, and not a weakness. It is in this mode that I have proceeded in trying to 
make sense of how our previous species concepts have failed us; namely by trying to make 
explicit the tacit assumptions in each, and how each has fallen prey to certain positivistic 
tendencies from previous eras. In the case of species, ommon sense notions need to be expelled, 
as species function primarily within a scientific framework, so reconciliation is not necessary, 
although it is necessary to point out how “Manifest” notions of species have stilted progress in 
our understanding of them. As I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, despite the recognition by 
species concept theorists in modern times that species are, in the end, entities tied to a specific 
scientific theory of evolution, the tendency to treat them in an a priori, intuitive manner is still 
not lost. Mayr’s Biological Species Concept may insist on its being strictly naturalistic, or 
biological, yet it ignores a whole host of factors which contribute to evolution and speciation, 
turning itself into a tautology in order to evade criti ism. I argue that these tendencies are a 
hangover from previous tacit understandings of species which we have yet to recognize and 
thwart. 
 
The other naturalist I mention at the beginning of this chapter is John Locke. His thinking on the 
nature of Real and Nominal essences should shed more light on our understanding of how a 
naturalistic metaphysics might differ from an analytic one. Locke, in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690) made the distinction between Real and Nominal essences. The 
Real essence “is what makes something what it is, and in the case of physical substances, it is the 
underlying physical cause of the object's observable qualities” (Jones 2013). The Nominal 
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essence, on the other hand is “an abstract idea that we make when we identify similar qualities 
shared by objects; the nominal essence is the idea of those shared similarities.” (Jones 2013). 
One could, however crudely, make an analogue between Locke’s Real essence and Sellars’ 
Scientific image, as well as between Locke’s Nominal essence and Sellars’ Manifest image. 
Even though Sellars is dealing with overarching world views, and Locke with individual objects, 
there is still something to say for how they relate in similar ways to our discussion of naturalized 
metaphysics. One could make the comparison between how something’s Nominal essence falls 
within a folk, or common sense framework, or understanding of the world. So, the idea of a lion, 
for instance, invokes a number of ideas about what a lion is in the mind of the common person 
using the word, i.e. a mammal of such and such a size, with a mane, a golden colouring, sharp 
teeth, etc. This is the Nominal essence of a lion, but it is also an understanding of a lion as part of 
the Manifest image of the world; our common sense or intuitive understanding of a lion. The 
Real essence of a lion, however, refers to the cause of how lions came to be lions, that is, a 
distinct species. This is a scientific issue, and so fit  within the Scientific image of the world. A 
lion came to be a lion through a complex process of evolution involving a number of 
mechanisms acting over a very large timescale. The word “lion” as understood in a Nominal or 
Manifest way is not the same as it is understood in a Real or Scientific way, although in this 
particular case, the referent does appear to match up. 
  
I will argue here that the Cohesion concept of species aims at the Real essence of species, and 
not the Nominal. I also contend that previous recent species concepts, although earnest in their 
aims, end up hitting upon Nominal essences of species. As I have argued before, this is because 
of the existence of residual “attitudes” towards species which we have inherited from the past. 
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One of these “attitudes” is a kind essentialism, in which we seek to find a set of criteria that we 
can use to bestow species-hood upon a certain population or groups of populations. The 
Aristotelian version of this was the seeking of certain characteristics of organisms which are 
essential to its being that thing. In more modern times, despite explicit efforts to reject it, kind 
essentialism crops up in the form of operationalist definitions of species. So, the essential 
characteristic of a species under Biological species v w is that its members interbreed (or can 
potentially interbreed). This is thought to be essential to what gives that species its unique 
species-ness. The temptation to look upon this view as reflective of a Real essence exists because 
it is a causal definition. But, as I have argued previously, the rejection of other possible main 
causes of evolution means that the definition becomes tautological and operational, and so begins 
to resemble essentialism in the Aristotelian sense. 
 
The Cohesion concept itself, to be clear, is a typeof ssentialism, though not in the Aristotelian 
sense. Again, Locke’s distinction makes this clearer. Strict definitions of things (Essences) are, 
for Locke, always Nominal. That is, they follow the usage of the word, and not the underlying 
causes which make something what it is. We cannot sum up the Real essence of a thing in terms 
of an explicit definition. As soon as we do this wear  committed to a nominal description. So, 
for Locke, species definitions like the Biological one, or the Mate Recognition one, are always 
nominal as they get at definitions of words, and not the things themselves (the underlying 
causes). Such definitions are based on things which we can observe (I would extend this to 
measure, too). On the other hand, the Cohesion concept aims at the Real essence of species. It 
does away with the existence of a set of criteria for defining a species, and looks to the causal 
mechanisms which are responsible for giving that species its perceived Cohesion. Each species 
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‘essence’ must be found empirically (moving from the standpoint of the dominant theory, which 
is at this time evolutionary theory). Thus each ‘essence’ for each species will be unique. Of 
course, limitations do exist, as with Nominal essences, we are still constrained by what we can 
observe. We can mitigate these difficulties, however, by positing unobservable theory, which is 
precisely what the Cohesion concept does. 
 
9. Essentialism, Individuals, and the Real Essence 
 
The Cohesion concept of species is, as I have mentioned before, an essentialist doctrine. It is not, 
however, essentialist in the same sense that Aristotle argued for it. The essentialism I argue is 
inherent in the Cohesion concept is a causal essentialism, one which we can be understood as 
similar to Locke’s conception of the Real essence. In this chapter I will be making the case for 
why the Cohesion concept is essentialist. Next, I will make a distinction between essentialism as 
commonly understood in the literature, and the essentialism I think best describes that found in 
the Cohesion concept. I will then show how this essentialism is not a weakness of the concept, 
but rather a strength; how essentialism is a mark of go d scientific practice and not bad. The kind 
of essentialism which I propose in the following chapter has a great deal to do with causation, 
and so I will need to say something about that, too.  
 
The Cohesion concept is essentialist because it is making claims about the underlying nature of 
species. It is as simple as that, although not quite. It is not enough that it makes claims about the 
nature of species, as claims about the nature of species can be that they have no underlying 
essence. The exact claim that the Cohesion concept is making, however, is that there are various 
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underlying mechanisms involved in giving species their properties, and therefore their 
distinctness from other species. It is the result of these mechanisms interacting with each other 
that ensure that a species remains distinct. Without such forces, and the interaction of these 
forces, the species would fail to exist in its distinct form. This is, clearly, an essentialist way of 
thinking about species; there are certain properties, or facts about the world, which are necessary 
(essential) to the existence of such and such an entity.  
 
The way in which this type of essentialism differs from more common forms of essentialism, I 
believe, can best be explained using Locke’s distinctio  between Real and Nominal essences. 
Locke was an anti-essentialist in the Aristotelian se se. Traditionally, Locke has been understood 
to be opposed to the idea that entities in the world have any essence: 
 
That essence, in the ordinary use of the word (my emphasis), relates to sorts, and 
that it is considered in particular things no farthe  than as they are ranked into sorts, 
appears from hence; that take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort 
individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything 
essential to any of them instantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one without 
the other; which plainly shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am: 
God and nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me 
(Locke 1690).  
 
 





An accident or disease may very much change my colour or shape; a fever or fall 
may take away my reason or memory, or both (Locke 1690) 
 
 
Locke is here talking about essence in the ordinary use of the word, that is, as I understand it, the 
Aristotelian sense of the word. There are no properties which an individual has which are 
essential to it in this way; that is, properties which are perceived through direct observation. 
 
 
None of these [properties] are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual 
whatsoever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things (Locke 1690) 
 
For Locke, properties of things are only essential as far as we divide them into classes. These 
classes are nominalistic and man-made, and therefor not essential to their existence or to their 
nature. 
 
All of this may seem to contradict my assertion that e Cohesion concept is essentialistic as well 
as real. Surely an essentialist concept of species cannot claim to be real if no property of things is 
real? Not so if we see the Cohesion concept as referring to underlying, causal properties of 
species, and not simply the properties expressed in ind vidual organisms. Locke speaks of this as 
the Real essence of a thing, and places it in opposition to the Nominal essence. Still, Locke did 
60 
 
say that Real essences belonged to types of things a d never individuals. So, while the Nominal 
essence of gold might be a substance of such and such a colour and such and such a weight, the 
Real essence (that thing which causes, or gives ris to these properties) still belongs to the whole 
class of gold, and individual instances of gold have no essence. This is a contentious issue, 
namely for the status of individuals in relation to essences. It is an important consideration for 
myself and this thesis as my claim is that species ar  individuals and they have essences. Some 
have interpreted Locke as being open to this idea, as Jones says: 
 
On the other hand, if real essences are only for sorted individuals, then there are no 
real essences for individuals until we have classified them by a nominal essence; 
until an individual is sorted, it only has an internal constitution, not a real essence. 
If one adopts the relativized real essence interpretation of the Essay, then there are 
no real essences for unsorted individuals. If, however, one adopts the unrelativized 
real essence interpretation, then it appears possible that Locke could think that 
unsorted individuals have a real essence and not just an internal constitution. 
(Jones; 2013).  
 
I tend to agree with Jones’s unrelativized real essence interpretation, but I would go further than 
that and argue that Locke probably would have endorsed a view of unsorted individuals having 
real essences had he been privy to a lot of modern philosophising on individuals. Denying that an 
individual can have a real essence places them in murky ontological water. Surely, if a real 
essence is something which gives a thing its thing-ness, and is independent of our knowledge of 
it (indeed, real essences are, according to Locke, mostly unknowable), it wouldn’t make sense 
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for it only to exist in conjunction with a nominal essence. Surely it must exist independently. 
Even conceding that not all individuals are essence-less, only unsorted ones, the sorted 
individuals only receive an essence in as far as they belong to a type, and not in terms of their 




An individual thing can only be pointed to. This is what distinguishes them from classes. Classes 
are groups of things which share certain common properties or characteristics. Classes can be 
grouped according to properties which are not, by necessity, contained within the group; that is, 
they can be defined in a non-circular way. In a grouping of vehicles all possessing the colour 
white and named “Bright Cars”, we have an independent finition of the colour white, which 
we can then look for in other cars to see whether ty fit into the group termed “Bright Cars”. 
With individuals, there is no no-circular way of defining them. There is no way one could 
comprehensively outline every property of an indiviual, and then understand that collection of 
properties without explicit reference to the indiviual itself. An exhaustive list of properties for 
an individual thing cannot be the essence of that indiv dual, because in outlining these properties 
we have simply re-described the thing itself. This is imilar in many ways to Locke’s distinction 
between simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas come t  us through experience only. We cannot 
define such ideas as, according to Locke, a definition s “the showing the meaning of one word 
by several other not synonymous terms.” (Locke 2004). 
 
We haven’t got the cause of why that thing is distinct from other things. For instance, one could 
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try to define me by saying “Russell is a male of 26 years old, born in Durban on such a date, with 
blood type x, height y, weight z, to such and such parents, with the following moral code, having 
experienced such and such an experience on such and such a date…” until you have exhausted 
every property of me (assuming such a thing is even conceptually possible). One would still not 
have arrived at my essence. This collection of prope ties is not what causes me to be me, it is me. 
 
Locke was anti-essentialist in the sense that he beli ved that we cannot know what the real 
essence of an object or type is. That is, we cannot k w the deep internal constitution of an 
object which gives it its properties. Locke’s skepticism is epistemic, not ontological, and he 
admits himself that all things must have some kind of essence; something which gives them their 
being: 
 
[An essence] may be taken for the being of anything whereby it is what it is. And 
thus the real internal, but generally. . . unknown, constitution of thing whereon their 
discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence. (Locke 1928) 
 
 
The problem is, according to Locke, that we cannot know what these things are (or rather, we 
cannot observe them, so we cannot use them in our classifications). I have spoken at length 
already about the importance of unobservables in the form of theory, and it is my feeling that 
unobservables such as these provide a sufficient bridge to making Locke’s real essences a viable 
way of approaching classifications. A successful scientific theory provides a causal explanation 
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for the way things are, thus giving us a way into its real essence. The epistemic problems that 
Locke faced at the time are greatly diminished today. 
 
Essentialism, as I have argued before, stems from god scientific practice, not bad. Aristotle’s 
essentialism, whilst outdated, made use of his contemporary understanding and theories about 
the world. He did the best he could with what he had. One reason for the abandonment of theory 
and causation and the embracing of phenetics and pattern cladism in the biological sciences, was 
the need to reject a certain kind of essentialism fro  cropping up in our scientific practice. It was 
thought that positing any kind of theory in our classification of the natural world was done a 
priori, and therefore, in many ways, at random. Thene d for a classification system based purely 
on empirical methods was what was apparently needed. Essentialism, however, is not the enemy 
here, if, like I have said, we seek out the real essences as posited by Locke. Such essences are 
only attainable, however, through the introduction of theory, which gives us a causal explanation 
for the way things are. Essentialism of this kind is necessary if we want to avoid the pitfalls of 
other approaches such as extreme micro reduction (Cllier et al. 1996) 
 
The gist of my argument defending naturalized metaphysics is that we should not throw out the 
impulse to introduce theory; rather, we should amend the theories. The alternative, as history has 
proven, leads us down paths which are not useful  
 
So, what are the relevant causes involved in giving a species its distinct-ness from other species? 
It is important to remember here that different causes apply to different types of things when it 
comes to individuation. For instance, for most physical objects in the world, their particular 
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spatio-temporal properties give us the ability to distinguish between them. For other things in the 
world (say, consciousness, or personality), spatio-temporality gives us very little to go on. 
Likewise, in order to individuate species, we must be clear about the relevant causes of their 
distinctness. In this case, as I have stated previously, they are the various mechanisms relevant to 
the theory of evolution.  It is this cause, which, when (or if) discovered gives us the Real essence 
of that thing. We discover the essence of the indivdual once we have embarked on empirical 
research. Of course, it may be the case that the thing in question has no Real essence, and is 
therefore not a distinct thing at all, or perhaps, it has a certain degree of distinctness or 
individuality. We must start from the position of hypothesis about observed entities and then 
seek to find the causes which give it identity. Someti es we may find that there are no real, 





As can be seen from the preceding arguments, species concepts are ubiquitous and varying and 
because of this a great deal of confusion abounds. My solution is to adopt a naturalistic approach 
to metaphysics, and adopt a species concept (the Cosion concept) which is mindful of actual 
scientific theory. There are a number of different forces involved in the process of evolution; a 
process which drives the increasing diversity we see in the living world. A suitable species 
concept must bear all of these processes in mind, lest we fall into the trap of defining species in 
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